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I. INTRODUCTION
What do marijuana, tort reform, telephone competition and legislative
ethics have in common? Each of these issues has been the subject of an
initiative in Alaska.
In the State of Alaska, the people's right to initiate law is guaranteed
by the Constitution. This right, however, is a limited one Not
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1. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("The people may propose and enact laws by the
initiative ... ."). Many municipal charters, such as the Municipal Charter for
Anchorage, also guarantee the right to initiate law. See, eg., ANCHORAGE
MUNICIPAL CHARTER art. 11(1), art. III, § 3.02(a).
2. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7; ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.010 (1988). Pursuant
to the Alaska Constitution, an initiative may not dedicate revenue, make or repeal
appropriations, create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe court rules,
or enact local or special legislation. Many local governments also provide for the
right to initiate local legislation and place similar limitations on that right. See, e.g.,
ANCHORAGE MUNICIPAL CHARTER art. I, § 3.02(a).
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surprisingly, questions concerning the proper scope of initiatives have made
and continue to make fertile ground for litigation.
Initiative law has become increasingly relevant to practitioners in
Alaska. Initiatives are an important option for clients who are unable to
achieve changes through normal administrative or legislative channels.3
Clients also may be faced with an undesirable initiative sponsored by a
competitor or adverse interest group. Understanding the initiative process
and initiative law, therefore, is an important tool for every practitioner.
This article provides an overview of the legal grounds upon which an
initiative may be instituted, challenged and defended. Part II describes the
initiative process. Part M addresses the rules of construction applied in
reviewing an initiative and the scope of pre-election judicial review of an
initiative measure under Alaska law. Part IV surveys the various
restrictions on the use of initiatives that have been set forth in the Alaska
Constitution or adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court. Part V analyzes the
test to be applied for determining whether the required initiative summary
adequately describes the legislation sought. Finally, Part VI reviews the
circumstances under which the legislature can remove an initiative from the
ballot by passing a substantially similar law.
1I. THE IDTATTVE PROCESS
A. The Pre-Circulation Process: Steps One through Five
The process for state initiatives in Alaska consists of ten steps. The
initial five steps occur before the general signature-gathering effort
3. The telephone competition initiative sponsored by General Communication
Inc. ("GCI") is a prime example of the usefulness of initiatives. For over seven
years, GC1 sought to have the Alaska Public Utilities Commission ("APUC") open
the in-state telecommunications market to competition. Affidavit of Ronald- A.
Duncan at 2, Clarke v. McAlpine, No. 3AN-89-7403 Civil (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 17,
1989). The APUC refused to do so. Believing that the public wanted in-state
telephone competition, GI turned to the initiative process. Within a few months,
GCI gathered over 50,000 signatures - far more than enough to place the initiativeon the ballot. Afffidavit of Ronald A. Duncan at 2, Clarke v. Mc~ ine, No. 3AN-89-
7403 Civil (Alaka Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1989).
Another recent example of the efficacy of the initiative process is the initiative
to "recrmalize" m aijuana in Alaska. A group that disagreed with the Alaska
Supreme Court's decision in Ravin v. State of Alaska, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975),wih held thaat possession of mari'juaa by adults at home for personal use isconstitutionally protected, succeeded in placing the issue on the statewide b llot 
and
in obtaining a rversal of the law. See ALASKA ST AT. § 11.1.060 (Supp. 1992);
ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.190(b) (1989). litigation was commenced soon after theelection to challenge the substantive law enacted by that initiativ , although 
not on
the ground that it volated the restrictions against the use 
of initiatives as discussed
in thiis article. See Complaint, Alaskans or riva v. State, 
No. 3AN-91-1746 Civil
(Aaska Super. ,Ct. March 4, 1991).
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commences. To begin, the initiator must draft the proposed bill in
accordance with statutory requirements regarding form Next, the initiator
must form a three-member initiative committee, circulate the proposed bill,
and obtain at least 100 signatures from qualified voters. Third, the
initiator must submit an application to the lieutenant governor7
The fourth step consists of the lieutenant governor's review of the
initiative.8 The lieutenant governor must either certify the initiative or
notify the initiative committee in writing of the denial and the grounds
therefor? There are three bases for denial by the lieutenant governor: (1)
the proposed bill is not in "the required form" because, for example, it
contains prohibited subjects; (2) the application is not substantially in "the
required form"; or (3) there are not enough qualified sponsors. 0
The review by the lieutenant governor's office is quite thorough.
However, certification by both the attorney general's office and the
lieutenant governor's office does not, by any means, make an initiative
litigation-proof. Even after approval, the practitioner needs to be prepared
for litigation.
Approval or disapproval of the application by the lieutenant governor
triggers the primary opportunity for litigation. Anyone who disagrees with
the lieutenant governor's determination must file a lawsuit in superior court
within thirty days of the date on which notice of the determination was
4. Cf. ANCHORAGE MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.50.050 (1980) (failing to provide any
pre-screening steps by the local government).
5. According to Alaska Statutes section 15.45.040, the proposed bill must: (1)
be confined to one subject; (2) have a title that expresses the subject of the bill; (3)
have an enacting clause that states, "Be it enacted by the people of the State of
Alaska"; and (4) be free of any subjects prohibited by Alasea Statutes section
15.45.010. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.040 (1988); see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.010
(1988). In drafting the initiative, it is important to prepare a marketable title -- one
that will be appealing to potential subscribers to the ifnitiative.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.030 (1988). The initiative committee consists of three
sponsors, all of whom are qualified voters and all of whom must sign the application
with the proposed bill attached. The three sponsors "shall represent all sponsors and
subscribers in matters relating to the initiative." Id. The other 100 or more
signatories (which may include the original three sponsors) are designated as
sponsors. Id. § 15.45.060. Additional sponsors may be designated upon notifying the
lieutenant governor. I&.
7. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2; ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.020 (1988). The precise
form of the application is specified by Alaska Statutes section 15.45.030. ALASKA
STAT. § 15A5.G30 (1988). A deposit of $100 must accompany the application; this
deposit is refundable, however, if the application is properly filed. Ld § 15.45.020.
8. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.070 (1988). The lieutenant governor sends a copy of
the initiative to the attorney general's office for legal review.
9. I& §§ 15.45.070-.080.
10. Id. § 15.45.080.
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given." This is a strict deadline, applying to all persons, not just the
initiative committee. 1
2
The fifth and final pre-circulation step is the preparation of the
petitions for circulation. The lieutenant governor is responsible for
preparing the petitions, including "an impartial summary of the subject
matter of the bill."13 As discussed in more detail in Part V of this article,
the "impartial" summary may be controversial and often serves as a ground
for litigation.' 4 If possible, it is important for the sponsors to work with
the lieutenant governor's office at this stage to ensure that a proper and
legally defensible summary is prepared.
B. Circulation and Review of the Petitions: Steps Six and Seven
The objective of the signature-gathering stage is to have the petitions
signed by "qualified voters equal in number to [ten] percent of those who
voted in the preceding general election and resident in at least two-thirds
of the election districts of the state."" These signatures must be obtained
within one year from the time that the sponsors receive notice from the
lieutenant governor that the petitions have been prepared. 6 The petitions
may be circulated only by a sponsor, appearing in person. 17
After gathering the necessary number of signatures, the next step is to
file the petitions with the lieutenant governor for his or her review.' The
lieutenant governor has a maximum of sixty days to determine whether a
sufficient number of qualified voters have signed the petition and whether
11. IaL § 15.45240.
12. McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P2d 81 (Alaska 1988). The Alaska
Supreme Court initially construed Alaska Statutes section 15.45240 to apply to
the initiative committee. Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P2d 456, 459 (Alaska 974). In
University of Alaska, the court overruled that portion of the Engstrom holding.
University of Alaska, 762 P.2d at 85.
13. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.090 (1988); see also ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 3.
14. See infra Part V (discussing the initiative petition summary).
15. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (1988); see also ALASKA CONSr. art. XI, § 3.
When asked by the initiative committee, the lieutenant governor must provide the
number of persons who voted in the preceding general election. ALASKA STAT. §15.45.090 (f988).
16. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (1988).
17. Iad § 15.45.110. The sponsor must accordingly certify each petition by an
affidavit. Id. § :15.45.130. Extensive coordination and an ample sponsor base are
needed to meet this signature-gathering requirement. Some initiators hire sponsors
to gather signatures and compensate them on a per signature basis. This technique
was used by GCI for the telephone competition initiative discussed above. See supra
note 3.
18. ALASKA CONST. art XI, § 3; ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.150 (1988). It bears
repeating that the signatures must be gathered and filed within twelve months of the
preparation of the petition. If this deadline is not met, the petition will have no force
or effect. ALAIA STAT. § 15.45.140 (1988).
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the signers resided in at least two-thirds of the election districts in the
state.1' Once the petitions are approved, the lieutenant governor, with the
assistance of the attorney general, prepares an initiative title and
proposition that will appear on the ballot2  As with the petition
summary, the initiator should work with the lieutenant governor and the
attorney general's office to prepare the most litigation-proof ballot title and
proposition possible.2? ' Doing so also provides the initiative sponsors with
an opportunity to ensure that the title and proposition accurately and
persuasively present the content and goals of the proposed law.
C. The Last Hurdles: Steps Eight through Ten
Before the director of elections can place the initiative proposition on
the ballot, the Alaska State Legislature must have convened and adjourned
once since the initiative petition was filed.2 This requirement gives the
legislature the opportunity to pass a "substantially similar" law.s If the
lieutenant governor, with the attorney general's formal concurrence,
determines that the legislature has passed a substantially similar law, the
initiative petition becomes void4
In order to clear the next to the last hurdle, the initiative petition must
withstand any legal challenges that are brought. The time frame for such
19. ALASKA SrAT. §§ 15.45.150-.160 (1988). The initiative committee does have
the opportunity to cure a latent defect in the number of qualified voters' signatures
obtaifed. Mis may be done by circulating and submitting a supplementary petition
within 30 days of the date the lieutenant governor notified the committee that the
petition was improperly filed. Id § 15.45.170.
20. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.180 (1988). In six words or less, the ballot title shall
indicate "the general subject of the proposition." In 100 words or less, the
proposition shall "give a true and impartial summary of the proposed law." Id. The
ballot proposition must also meet a "readability" standard designed to ensure that
it can be easily understood by a voter who reads at approximately the eighth grade
level. IM § 15.60.005; see Memorandum from Mike Davis, Representative, Alaska
State egislature, to the House Judiciary Committee (Apr. 27,1987) (on file with the
Alaska Law Review) (explaining the purpose of the statute's requirements).
21. See infra Part V (discussing summaries and ballot titles).
22. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.190 (1988); 1984 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. 139. In
addition, a period of at least 120 days must have expired between the adjournment
of the legislative session and the first available statewide general, special, or primary
election. Id.
23. ALASKA CoNsT. art. XI, § 4.
24. IM; ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.210 (1988); see infra Part VI (discussing the issue
of substantially similar legislation).
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challenges is notably shortL2 Legal and client resources must therefore
be readied for an intense battle.
Obtaining a majority of the votes cast at the election is the final step
before an initiative can become a new state law. For some initiatives, this
has proven to be the most difficult hurdle.26 Once all ten steps have been
taken, the lieutenant governor must certify that the law has been enacted;
the initiative becomes effective as law ninety days after this certification.27
m1. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
A. Rules of Construction
Because the right of the people to enact law through the initiative is
guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution,2 the Alaska Supreme Court has
mandated that "the people's right of initiative should be liberally
25. Any litigation challenging a statewide initiative must be resolved within the
time constraints imposed by Alaska Statutes section 15.45.190. ALASKA STAT.
§ 15.45.190 (1938); see supra note 22 and accompanying text. In some instances,
depending upon factors such as when the legislature will next meet and when the
next general election will be held, this time frame may allow only several months for
an initiative challenge to be litigated and finally resolved in the courts.
For initiatives not subject to pre-circulation review, such as those for the
Municipality of Anchorage, time frames may be even more compressed. For
example, in the Keep ATU Alaskan case, the Municipality refusedto place the
initiative on the ballot just 51 days prior to the election. Letter from Lelane
Fegon Municipal Clerk, Municipality of Anchorage, to Mary Frohne, Organizer,
Authority Initiative (Aug. 10,1991) (on file with the Alasa Law Review). Four days
after the refusal, the plantiffs brought suit, and five days later filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction req that the defendants take all necessary' steps to place
the initiative on the ballo. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, Keep ATU Alaskan v. Muicipality of Anchorage, No. 3AN-
91-6958 Civil (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1991). After full briefing and oral
argument, the superior court granted the preliminary injunction -- only nine days
after the motion was brought. Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction, Keep ATU Alaskanv. Municipality of Anchorage, No. 3AN-91-6958 Civil(Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1991). The Municipality of Anchorage subsequently filed
an emergency petition for review with the Alaska Supreme Court, and the courtdenied th  petition before the election. Order, Munici ality of Anchorage v. Keep
ATU Alaskan, No. S-4725 (Alaska Sept. 16, 1991).
26. For instance, Alaskan voters have rejected initiatives: (1) repealing limited
entry in commercial fisheries (1976); (2) establishing refundable deposits on certain
beverage containers (1978); (3) limiting state fundng of abortions (1983); (4)
regulating gambling and establishing an Aaskan Gambling Board (1990); (5) enacting
laws relating to personal consumption of fish and game (1982); and (6 .amending
laws relating to tbe Alaska Railroad (1990). See ALASKA DIVSION OF llLECTIONS,
REPORT OF INrIATIVEs APPEARING ON THE BALLOT IN ALASKA (Apr. 19, 1991)(on file with the Alaska Law Review).
27. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.20 (1988).
28. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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construed."29 The Alaska Supreme Court has established two primary
rules governing judicial review of initiatives. First, constitutional and
statutory provisions relating to initiatives should be liberally interpreted.
The court has stated that "[iln reviewing an initiative prior to submission
to the people, the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions pertaining to the use of initiatives should be liberally construed
so that 'the people [are] permitted to vote and express their will on the
proposed legislation. .... ",30 Second, if an initiative can be interpreted
in a manner consistent with the constitution, that interpretation must
prevail. Specifically, the court has held that "[w]hen one construction of
an initiative would involve serious constitutional difficulties, that
construction should be rejected if an alternative interpretation would render
the initiative constitutionally permissible."'
Consistent with these primary rules of construction, the Alaska
Supreme Court has established three corollaries. First, "'all doubts as to
technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact letter of procedure
will be resolved in favor [of allowing the people to vote on the
initiative]."' Second, the court's inquiry must not be directed to the
wisdom of the goals or approaches embodied in the initiative, for those
decisions rest with the voters 3 Third, courts should adopt a deferential
attitude toward initiatives.' In short, the Alaska Supreme Court has
steadfastly defended the right of Alaskans to enact law through initiative
as "an act of direct democracy guaranteed by our constitution."35
However, a recent case suggests that the pendulum may be swinging
toward a more restrictive approach in interpreting initiatives. In Citizens
29. McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 91 (Alaska 19P); Thomas v.
Bailey, 595 P.d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979).
30. Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974) (quoting Cope v.
Toronto, 332 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1958) (alteration in oinal)), overruled on other
grounds by McAlpine v. Umv. of Alaska, 762 P2d 81 (ZAaska 1988).
31. Engstrom, 528 P.2d at 462.
32. IaL at 462 (quoting Cope v. Toronto, 332 P2d 977, 979-80 (Utah 1958)).
33. Ia at 463. Furthermore, a court should not consider the legality of the
legislation proposed by initiative prior to the election. The court is authorized to
consider only whether the initiative relates to a prohibited subject (i.e., any of the
subjects prohibited by the state constitution or municipal charter), or whether the
initiative complies with the legal requirements for placing it on the ballot. University
of Alaska, 762 P.2d at 87 n.7; Engstrom, 528 P2d at 460 n.13.
34. Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska 1985)(holding that courts should be reluctant to invalidate initiatives).
35. Yute Air, 698 P2d at 1181. As one of Alaska's constitutional framers stated,
"[o]n the story of the initiative and referendum, [the people] have passed more good
laws than they have bad laws and that is as goodas you can say for any legislature."
Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, pt. 2, at 1179 (Jan. 4, 1956)
(remarks of Delegate Marston).
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Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine,36 the Alaska Supreme Court
invalidated a proposed initiative aimed at limiting contingency fee
agreements. The court based its decision on the prohibition against using
an initiative to prescribe a rule of court.37 In reaching this result, the
court appeared to revise its approach to construing initiative rights.
According to the court,
[It does not necessarily follow that a liberal construction of the
people's initiative power requires a narrow construction of the
limits that define the power. On the contrary, the mandate for
liberal construction of the initiative right in article XIL Section 11
concludes with a qualifying, cautionary clause: "subject to the
limitations of Article XW" This reiterative warning underscores
the importance of the restrictions. Additionally, we must never
lose sight of another important right of the people implicated in
all cases of constitutional construction, namely the right to have
the constitution upheld as the people ratified it.... We must
interpret all constitutional provisions -- grants of power and
restrictions on power alike - as broadly as the people intended
them to be interpreted
The tenor of the court's decision in the Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform
opinion may be explained by the court's distaste for the issue involved:
the imposition of a rule of court by initiative. However, lower courts may
view the opinion as an invitation to more closely scrutinize whether an
initiative violates the subject-matter restrictions for initiatives.
In the most recent decision on initiative law, the Alaska Supreme Court
returned to a more liberal view of the rules of construction for initiatives.
City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureat09
involved a city code section designating hotel bed tax revenues for
purposes of tourist and entertainment activities, as well as other economic
development.4 The initiative at issue in that case repealed that city code
section and set aside hotel bed tax revenues for deposit in the city council
discretionary fund!' The court first announced that "[tlhe usual rule
applied by this court is to construe voter initiatives broadly so as to
preserve them whenever possible."42  The court then stated that
36. 810 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991).
37. Id. at 167; see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.010 (1988).
38. Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, 810 P.2d at 168 (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
39. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991); see infra pp. 14-16 for a full discussion of this
case.
40. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d at 1156.
41. Id. at 1155, 1157.
42. Id. at 1155 (citation omitted). Notably, in discussing the standards of
interpretation for initiatives, the court cited Thomas v. Bailey, not Citizens Coalition
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"initiatives touching upon the allocation of public revenues and assets
require careful consideration because the constitutional right of direct
legislation is limited by the Alaska Constitution."'43 The Fairbanks
Convention and Visitors Bureau court adhered to the "general rule that the
initiative power will be construed broadly,"'4 and held that the initiative
did not violate the restriction against dedicating funds j4
B. The Scope of Pre-Election Judicial Review of an Initiative Measure
under Alaska Law
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between
constitutional challenges that may be asserted prior to an initiative's
passage and those that may be asserted only after an initiative's passage.
According to the court, "[gleneral contentions that the provisions of an
initiative are unconstitutional are ,usticiable only after the initiative has
been enacted by the electorate.' '  The scope of review prior to the
enactment of an initiative is limited to the scope of the lieutenant
governor's pre-election review.47 Under the Alaska Supreme Court's
interpretation of the pre-election review statutes,
The lieutenant governor is charged with initially determining
whether an initiative application is in the "proper form." His
determinations include whether the sponsors and subscribers
complied with the legal procedures for placing an initiative on the
ballot, and whether the initiative contains statutorily or
constitutionally prohibited subjects which should not reach the
ballot48
Thus, a pre-election suit can be brought to determine only whether the
initiative relates to a prohibited subject (i.e., any of the subjects prohibited
for Tort Reform. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d at 1155; see
supra notes 29, 36-38 and accompanying text.
43. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d at 1155 (emphasis
added).
44. Id. at 1157.
45. Id, at 1159.
46. Boucher v. En8strom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 n.13 (Alaska 1974) (emphasis
added); Whitson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759,762 (Alaska 190. As
a general proposition, courts will refuse to pass on the constitutionality of prop osedlegislation. "Only after legislation becomes law will its constitutionalli be tested."
Engstrom, 528 P2d at 460 (quoting Iman v. Bolin, 404 P.2d 705,709 (Ariz. 1965)).
47. See McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P2d 81 (Alaska 1988); see supra notes
8-12 and accompanying text.
48. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d at 87 n.7 (citing ALASKA CONST. art XI, § 2;
ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.070-.080 (1988)).
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by the state constitution) or whether the initiative complies with the legal
requirements for placement on the ballot4 9
IV. SUBJECT MATTER LIMITATIONS
The Alaska Constitution sets forth specific limitations on the subject
matter of initiatives. Specifically, the constitution prohibits the use of an
initiative: (1) to make or repeal appropriations; (2) to dedicate revenues; (3)
to enact local or special legislation; or (4) to create courts, define the
jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules.! Each of these limitations
will be discussed in turm.
A. Appropriations
In four significant cases, the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed and
defined what constitutes an impermissible appropriation by initiative:
Thomas v. Bailey,-5 Alaska Conservative Political Action Committee
("ACPAC") v. Municipality of Anchorage,5' McAlpine v. University of
Alaska,53 and City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors
Bureau-" In two of those cases (Bailey and ACPAC), the court
determined that "give-away" programs constituted impermissible
appropriations. The Bailey court determined that the Alaska Homestead
Act55 was an appropriation because it gave away state land.s Similarly,
49. The Alaska Supreme Court has deviated from this general rule in two cases,
both of which involved local, rather than state initiatives. See Whitson v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 608 P2d 759 (Alaska 1980); Municipality of Anchorage
v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3 (Alaska 1977). In Whitson and Frohne, the court held that an
initiative may be reviewed to determine whether the legislative body to which the
initiative is directed has the power to enact such legislation. In both cases, the court
held that the initiatives sought legislative ends that the municipal assembly could not
lawfully accomplish. Whitson dealt with an initiative to amend the municipal charter
to require voter ratification of new taxes or tax increases. The court held that the
initiative conflicted with state statutes givin& broad taxing authority to the assembly.
Whitson, 608 P2d at 761. In Frohne, an initiative to limit the assembly's choice of
district apportionment was held to conflict with state statutes dealing with the
unification of local governments. Frohne, 568 P2d at 8.
50. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7. Similar restrictions may be found in city
charters in Alaska. For instance, the Anchorage Municipal Charter restricts the use
of initiatives for the purposes of: (1) establishing budgets; (2) fixing mill levies; (3)
authorizing the issuance of bonds; or (4) appropriating funds. ANCHORAGE
MUNICIPAL CHARTER art. I, § 3.02(a); see also ANCHORAGE MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 2.50.020 (1980).
51. 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979).
52. 745 P.d 936 (Alaska 1987).
53. 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
54. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991).
55. See ALASKA STAT. § 38.09.010-.900 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth the
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in ACPAC, the court ruled that the sale of a municipally-owned electric
company to Chugach Electric for one dollar was clearly a give-away
program.5
It was against this legal background that McAlpine v. University of
Alaska5 was decided. This case addressed the validity of the Community
College Initiative. After the State of Alaska merged the community
colleges into the University of Alaska, a group of citizens circulated a
petition to require the state to reestablish and fund a separate independent
community college system." The lieutenant governor approved the
initiative for placement on the ballot.6 Subsequently, the University of
Alaska and others sued to remove it from the ballot, arguing primarily that
it constituted an impermissible appropriation.61
The Community College Initiative petition consisted of four
sentences.62 The Alaska Supreme Court carefully analyzed each sentence
of the petition to determine whether any one sentence constituted an
impermissible appropriation.63 The original Community College Initiative
stated:
BE rT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
ALASKA:
There shall be established a separate independent Community College
System in the State of Alaska. The University of Alaska shall transfer to
the Community College System of Alaska such real and personal property
as is necessary to the independent operation and maintenance of the
Community College System. The amount of property transferred shall be
commensurate with that occupied and operated by the Community
Colleges on November 1, 1986. Properties created for the purpose of joint
use by the University and Community College System shall continue to be
jointly used."
The supreme court took issue with the third sentence of the original
initiative: "The amount of property transferred shall be commensurate with
that occupied and operated by the community colleges on November 1,
1986." 65 Ultimately, the court struck this sentence from the original
current version of the Alaska Homestead Act).
56. Bailey, 595 P.2d at 9.
57. ACPAC, 745 P2d at 938.
58. 762 P.2d at 81.
59. I& at 83.
60. Id
61. IM at 84.
62. I at 83.
63. Id at 89-91.
64. I& at 96.
65. IM at 90.
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initiative and directed the superior court to order the lieutenant governor to
place the remaining three-sentence initiative on the ballot.6 The court
reasoned that the initiative sponsors had intended to dictate the scale of the
operation of the new community college entity, thereby eliminating the
legislature's discretion over appropriations!' The court found that this
sentence mandated a community college operation on the same scale as the
one in place two years earlier, prior to a period of serious cuts in the
university budget.' Thus, the provision would have significantly altered
the allocation of assets to community colleges, and it would have required
the legislature to spend a specifically defined amount of money. 9
In concluding that the Community College Initiative, once redacted,
did not constitute an appropriation, the court returned to the ACPAC and
Bailey decisions. The court noted that "in neither ACPAC nor Bailey did
we [the court] conclude that the term appropriation includes the setting
aside of property (other than money) outside the context of give-away
programs."7
0
In analyzing the Community College Initiative, the court expressly
observed that the initiative, as redacted by the court, did, in fact, remove
some appropriation discretion from the legislature: "The community
college initiative ... require[s] that the state property be devoted to
community colleges."7' Nevertheless, the court followed the rule of
liberal construction and concluded that the redacted initiative did not
constitute an appropriation. 2 The precise holding of University of Alaska
is straightforward; the court stated that an appropriation problem exists
only where an initiative "designate[s] the use of state assets in a manner
that is executable, mandatory, and reasonably definite with no further
legislative action."' The court's holding in University of Alaska is
appropriately narrow, given the constitutional right of the people to initiate
law.
The couirt further clarified its analysis of appropriations in City of
Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau,74 which
distinguished between initiatives that make appropriations and those that
repeal appropriations. With respect to the former, the court concluded that
66. Id. at 96.
67. I& at 90-91.
68. Id. at 90.
69. IM.
70. Id at 38 (emphasis added).
71. IM at 91 (emphasis added).
72. IM.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991).
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the term "appropriations" should be construed broadly, consistent with the
intent of Alaska's constitutional framers to avoid give-away programs.75
For initiatives that repeal appropriations, however, the court concluded that
"the purposes of the constitution are not met by construing the term
'appropriations' broadly."7 6
In recognizing this distinction, the court referred to the two primary
purposes for restricting initiatives that constitute appropriations: (1) to
prevent the enactment of give-away programs that would endanger the state
treasury; and (2) to ensure that the legislature retains responsibility for the
budget and control over state assets. 7 The court noted that "[i]n the
context of an initiative that would repeal an appropriation, only the second
of these purposes -- retention of control of the appropriation process in the
legislative body -- is relevant" 8 Thus, the court concluded that the term
"appropriation" need not be construed broadly to accomplish this
purpose."
B. Dedicated Revenues
The Alaska Constitution also specifically provides that an "initiative
shall not be used to dedicate revenues."'  This prohibition is designed to
ensure that the legislature be accorded the greatest flexibility and control
in managing the state budget and annual expenditures.8' In City of
Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau,8 the Alaska
Supreme Court construed this restriction for the first time.
The court began its analysis by noting that a previous decision, State
v. Alex,8 had interpreted a similar constitutional provisionprohibiting the
legislature's dedication of taxes to any special purpose. In Alex, the
court struck down a statute that imposed a mandatory tax on the sale of
75. IdM at 1156.
76. IdM at 1156-57 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1156.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. IaM at 1156-57.
80. ALASKA CONsr. art. XI, § 7.
81. See State v. Alex, 646 P2d 203, 209-10 (Alaska 1982) (discussing the
dedicated revenue prohibition of article IX, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution);
1959 Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7, at 2 ("[1]he delegates were desirous of
eliminating dedications so that the Legislature would have the greatest flexibility in
allocating tax revenues on a basis of need.").
82. 818 P2d 1153 (Alaska 1991).
83. 646 P.2d 203 (Alaska 1982).
84. See ALASKA CONSr. art. IX, § 7 ('qhe proceeds of any state tax or license
shall not be dedicated to any special purpose ... ").
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salmon to fid regional aquaculture associations.85  To analyze the
dedicated tax prohibition, the court looked to studies prepared for use at the
Alaska Constitutional Convention.8 These studies indicated that
dedicated taxes were popular because they reduced taxpayer resistance by
guaranteeing that the tax would be used to benefit those who paid it The
studies also cautioned against permitting dedicated taxes on the ground that
such earmarking curtailed the exercise of budgetary controls and amounted
to an abdication of legislative responsibility.'
In Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, the Alaska Supreme
Court distinguished the hotel bed tax allocation initiative from the initiative
in State v. Alex.8 The court noted that in Alex, the allocation of revenues
to the regional aquaculture associations was mandatory, "leaving no
discretion to the legislature to spend the money in any other way."'89
Furthermore, the Alex legislation created something akin to a "right" to the
taxes/assessments for the aquaculture associations. 9° The initiative in
Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, on the other hand, did not
create a "right" for any group or person, nor did it create any mandatory
expenditures." The court concluded that the bed tax allocation initiative
did not suffer from a dedicated fund infirmity because it did not infringe
on flexibility in the budget process02 Thus, under the standard employed
by the court, an initiative will not violate the restriction against dedicated
funds so long as the initiative does not unduly infringe on the
government's discretion to allocate funds in the budget process.
C. Local or Special Legislation
The Alaska Constitution provides that an "initiative shall not be used
... to enact local or special legislation.' 3 Boucher v. Engstrom9 is the
only Alaska case to date that addressed the question of "local or special
legislation" in the initiative context Engstrom dealt with an initiative
proposal to relocate the state capital to a location other than Anchorage or
Fairbanks, the two largest population centers in the state. After the
85. Alex, 646 P.2d at 210.
86. Id at 208-10.
87. Id at_209 n.5 (citing ALASKA SrATEHOOD COMMISSION, 3 CONSTTUIONAL
ST Ims, pt. IX, at 27 (1955)).
88. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d at 1158.
89. Id.
90. IM
91. Id
92. IM at 1159.
93. ALASKA CONsT. art. XI, § 7.
94. 528 P2d 456 (Alaska 1974).
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sponsors obtained the requisite number of voters' signatures on the
petitions and the lieutenant governor's office certified the initiative petition
for placement on the ballot, Engstrom filed suit in state superior court. 95
Engstrom claimed that the subject of the proposed bill was fatally defective
because, by excluding the Anchorage or Fairbanks areas from consideration
as possible capital sites, the proposition constituted local or special
legislation in violation of Article XI, section 7 of the Alaska
Constitution.96
The superior court agreed with Engstrom, and enjoined the lieutenant
governor from placing the initiative on the ballot.97 The State of Alaska
appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, and the supreme court reversed the
decision.98 The court held that the test for determining whether
legislation is local or special is "whether the subject matter is of common
interest to the whole state." 99 In other words, according to the court, "a
law does not cease to be general, and become local or special, because it
operates only in certain subdivisions of the state."'"° In adopting the
"statewide interest" test, the court specifically disapproved of the definition
of local legislation applied in Walters v. Cease.'0 In Walters, the court
observed that the legislation was local because it applied "only to a limited
number of geographical areas, rather than being widespread in its operation
throughout the state. '' w2
Under a simplified reading of Engstrom, an initiative that meets the
statewide interest test should not be held to constitute local or special
legislation."° The "statewide interest" test may be criticized as focusing
only on the "local" aspect of the prohibition, and ignoring "special"
legislation. Engstrom arguably supports the use of a broader test for
special legislation.' 04 Specifically, Engstrom may be read to require that
95. IM at 458.
96. Id. at 459.
97. Id
98. Id at 464.
99. Id. at 461.
100. I& at 461-62.
101. 394 P2d 670 (Alaska 1964).
102. IM at 672.
103. This position is supported by the decision in State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 644
nA9 (Alaska 1977), cert. dnied, 432 U.S. 901 (1977), in which the Alaska Supreme
Court noted that in Engstrom, it had found "that statewide interest in the location of
a new capital was sufficient to validate an initiative relocation proposal which excluded
Fairbanks and Anchorage as potential sites." Id. (emphasis added).
104. In a footnote, the Engstrom court indicated that the "test to be employed
[for local or special legislationl is substantially the same as that which would be
applied to legislative classifications challenged as being contrary to the equal
protection clause." Engstrom, 528 P2d 456, 463 n.25 (citations omitted).
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a court review the initiative to determine whether there is "any conceivable
factual basis" that would render the classification constitutional.
1
'
Parties opposing an initiative on special legislation grounds may
contend that the court should adopt a "fair and substantial relationship"
equal protection test' rather than an "any conceivable factual basis" test.
Given the time constraints associated with pre-election initiative challenges
and the mandated deference to the initiative process, the "fair and
substantial relationship" test is unwieldy and constitutionally suspectY17
In addition, litigants have the ability to fully challenge the initiative in
question on equal protection grounds if and when it is passed." Thus,
determining whether there is "any conceivable factual basis" for the
classification is more appropriate for a pre-election initiative challenge than
a more rigorous "fair and substantial relationship" analysis, which would
unduly burden the people's right to initiate law.
D. The Restriction Against Creating Courts, Defining the Jurisdiction of
Courts or Prescribing Court Rules
The Alaska Constitution sets forth the restriction against using an
initiative to create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts, or prescribe
court rules."l The Alaska Supreme Court broadly construed this
restriction in Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine,n °
which involved a tort reform initiative. As originally drafted, the initiative
contained three sections."' One section set maximum allowable
attorney's fees in personal injury cases."' The other two sections
proposed to after the statutory law governing apportionment of damages
and contribution among tortfeasors." 3
The lieutenant governor's office denied certification of the initiative on
the ground that the regulation of attorney's fees constituted an attempt to
105. MdL at 463.
106. These parties would likely rely on Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P2d 359, 362(Alaska 1976), Which modified Alaska's equal protection analysis.
107. Furthermore, the footnote in Engstrom, see supra note 104, was rendered
before the Alaska Supreme Court modified its equal protection analysis. Compare
Engstrom, 528 F.2d at 463 n25 with Isakson, 550 P2d at 362.
108. Notably, Isakson and the subsequent equal protection cases that employed
the "fair and substantial relationship" test invo ved enacted legislation - not pre-
election initiative challenges. See Isakson, 550 P.2d at 360; Principal Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. State, 780 P2d 1 ,23 1024 (Alaska 1989); State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc.,
787 P.2d 624, 625-26 (Alaska 1989).
109. ALASKA CONST. art XI, § 7.
110. 810 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991).
111. Id. at 163.
112. I
113. Id
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prescribe a rule of court in contravention of article X, section 7 and
Alaska Statutes section 15.45.010.114 The group sponsoring the initiative
filed suit in superior court and sought a temporary restraining order
directing the lieutenant governor's office to certify the initiative and
prepare the initiative petitions.15 The trial court denied the motion for
a temporary restraining order, and the supreme court denied a petition for
review.'1
6
After the lieutenant governor denied certification of the initiative
petition, the sponsors removed the section restricting contingency fee
agreements and resubmitted the initiative. The initiative was certified in
that form.n7 The voters passed the revised version of the initiative in the
1988 general election."8 Following the election, the sponsors sought a
ruling that the provision restricting contingency fee agreements did not
violate the constitution or statute. The state and the Alaska Academy of
Trial Lawyers ("AATL"), who had intervened, fied cross motions for
summary judgment The superior court agreed with the state and AATL
that the proposed provision was an attempt to prescribe a rule of court."'
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed." °  According to the court,
determining whether an initiative violates the constitutional and statutory
restrictions against enacting a court rule by initiative required a two-step
inquiry.1 2' The first inquiry addresses whether a limit on attorney
contingent fees is necessarily classifiable as a rule of court. If a contingent
fee limit is in fact a rule of court, the second question becomes whether
article XI, section 7 of the constitution removes such a rule from the scope
of the right to initiate law.'2
The court noted that the Alaska Bar Rules and the Code of Professional
Responsibility contained court rules that regulated contingent fees,'2 and
that courts in other jurisdictions had adopted court rules that imposed limits
114. Id. at 163-64; see ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.010 (1988) ("[Ain initiative may not
be proposed to ... create courts, to define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their
rules, or to enact local or special legislation."i.
115. Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, 810 P.2d at 163-64.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. IM.; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010-.060 (repealed 1987); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.080(d) (enacted 1987). For a discussion of the tort reform initiative as passed,
see Laurence Keyes, Alaska's Apportionment of Damages Statute: Problems for
Litigants, 9 ALASKA L REv. 1 (1992).
119. Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, 810 P.2d at 163-64.
120. Id. at 172.
121. Id. at 164.
122. Id.
123. See ALASKA BAR RULE 35; ALASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILTY DR 2-106, 5-103.
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strikingly similar to that proposed by the initiative." Thus, the court
held that the initiative provision limiting attorneys' contingent fees was
properly classifiable as a rule of court.&25
The court then examined whether the limit on contingent fees
constituted a court rule within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
The sponsor. of the initiative argued that a rule on contingent fees would
be promulgated by the court pursuant to its inherent authority to regulate
the practice of law, rather than the court's explicit rule-making authority.
Under this reasoning, such a rule could not be considered a court rule
within the meaning of the constitutional restiction.'6 The court rejected
this argument.
Looking to the purpose of the constitutional provision, the court
indicated that the constitutional framers prohibited the use of initiatives to
enact court rules because "they considered such rules far too sophisticated
and sensitive to be left vulnerable to the reach of the popular
initiative."' Similarly, the court stated that the "rules regulating the
practice of law often are equally as sophisticated, technical, or sensitive as
rules governing the administration, practice, and procedure in the
courts."'29 Thus, the court concluded that the restriction in article XII,
section 7 of the constitution extended to rules adopted by the court under
its inherent authority to regulate the practice of law and the conduct of
attorneys in the state. In light of the court's broad interpretation of the
restriction against enacting a court rule by initiative in Citizens Coalition
for Tort Reform, it will undoubtedly be difficult for any initiative relating
to the regulation of the practice of law or the conduct of attorneys to
withstand legal scrutiny.
E. Administrative Act
No constitutional or statutory provision exists to prohibit the enactment
of an administrative act by initiative. However, in Wolf v. Alaska State
124. Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, 810 P.2d at 165-66.
125. Id. at 165-67.
126. Id. at 168-69. The court acknowledged that there was a distinction between:(1) rules adopted by the court pursuant to its explicit rule-making authority to make
and promulgate rules governing court administration and rules governing practice and
procedure in civil andiinal=cases; and (2) rules adopted by the court pursuant to
its inherent authority to regulate the practice of law and conduct of attorneys.
Compare ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 15 with ALASKA CONsT. art. IV, § 1. However,
the court declined to apply the distinction to the restriction of article XI, section 7.
Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, 810 P2d at 168.
127. Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, 810 P.2d at 169.
128. Id. at 170 citing Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, pt. 4,
at 2978 (Ian. 217 5)i emarks of Delegate Robertson)).
129. Id.
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Housing Authority,so the Alaska Supreme Court stated in dicta 3 ' that
"the power of both initiative and referendum is restricted to legislative
ordinances, and does not extend to administrative measures."' More
recently, the Alaska Supreme Court appeared to move away from the
relatively restrictive language in Wolf by adopting a superior court opinion
applying a more liberal approach to the enactment of administrative acts
through initiative. In Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine,33 one of the
initiative's provisions required that the governor seek repeal of the federal
statute known as the Jones Act,'3 which mandated that United States
vessels be used only for shipping goods between United States ports. The
opponents of the initiative argued that the provision was "not law but rather
a plebi[s]cite directing administrative activities,"' 35 and therefore was not
a proper subject for initiative. The Yute Air court explicitly adopted the
superior court's holding that the initiative proposition constituted "law" and
was therefore a valid initiative."s
The superior court had noted that the line of authority cited by the
opponents of the initiative'7 was "analytically defective" because it
130. 514 P2d 233 (Alaska 1973).
131. The court held that the issue of whether the urban renewal ordinance was
a proper subject for referendum was moot because the same ordinance had been
subsequently adopted at a second election by an initiative that had not been
challenged. Wolf, 514 P2d at 235.
132. I& at 235 (citing EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CoRPoRATIONs § 16.55 (3d ed. 1969)). McQuillin indicates that the following criteria
should be considered in determining whether an initiative constitutes a legislative or
administrative act:
[1] Actions relating to subjects of a permanent and general character are
usually regarded as legislative, and those providing for subjects of a
temporary and special character are regarded as administrative. [21 In
this connection, an ordinance which shows an intent to form a permanent
rule of government until repealed is one of permanent operation .... [3]
The test of what is a legislative and what is an administrative proposition,
with respect to the initiative or referendum has further been said to be
whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law already
in existence. [4] The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if
it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its
nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body
itself, or some power superior to it. [51 Similarly, an act or resolution
constituting a declaration of public purpose and making provision for
ways and means of its accomplishment is generally legislative as
distinguished from an act or resolution which merely carries out the policy
or purpose alread declared by the legislative body.
EUGENE McQUILLiN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.55, at 266 (3d
ed. rev. 1989).
133. 698 P2d 1173, 1175-77 (Alaska 1985).
134. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1988).
135. Yute Air, 698 P2d at 1175.
136. I&
137. The superior court specifically referred to Seattle Building and Construction
Trades Council v. City of Seattle, 620 P.2d 82 (Wash. 1980) (holding that a proposed
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limited the use of municipal initiatives to adopt administrative acts but
failed to recognize that local governing bodies generally are vested with
"an admixture of both legislative and administrative powers," and that
"[liaws frequently reverse prior administrative decisions and set new
policies for administrators to follow."'1
The superior court had also rejected the argument that the initiative
provision was invalid because it established public policy on a subject
outside the jurisdiction of state lawmakers. 1 39 The superior court noted
that the state legislature "frequently enacts laws prescribing the conduct of
officials or agencies of state government on matters over which the state
has no legal jurisdiction," and therefore presumably the electorate also
could do so by initiative.14° The superior court went so far as to suggest
that:
Analytically, laws may be enacted on any subject under the sun: They can
command the tides to stand still for King Canute or the mountain to come
to Mohanuned. That they may or may not be effective is of no moment.
It will hardly do to say that a law may not be enacted because it is silly --
not at least at this late date. Only if one can point to some prohibition
expressed or implied in the state or federal constitutions can it be said that
some proposed law would violate the constitution and may not, therefore,
be the subject of an initiative.
The opinion of the superior court in Yute Air, as adopted by the Alaska
Supreme Court, represents the only published analysis of the administrative
act restriction in Alaska and is indicative of the court's liberal attitude
towards the use of initiatives. Yute Air indicates that an initiative will not
run afoul of the administrative act restriction so long as it relates to any
subject on which lawmakers could pass legislation.
V. THE INITATrIVE PEoTIeN SUMMARY
The Alaska Supreme Court has addressed the adequacy of the
lieutenant governor's initiative petition summary in only one case, Burgess
v. Miller.42 ]In this case, the court reviewed a subsistence preference
city initiative was beyond the scope of initiative power in that the state had plenary
control over the subject matter of the initiative and local governments had only those
administrative rights and powers accorded them by the legislature).
138. Yute Air, 698 P.2d at 1176.
139. i at 1176-77.
140. IM at 1177.
141. Id. at 1176.
142. 654 P.2d 273, 275 (Alaska 1982) ("[tibis ;veal raises a question of first
impression"). Cf. Boucher v. Bomhoff, 495 P.2d 7"(Alaska 1972) (concerning a
successful post-election challenge to the prefatory language on the referendum
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initiative petition entitled "Personal Consumption of Fish and Game." The
trial court ruled on summary judgment that the initiative summary
accurately stated the subject matter of the proposed law, and the Alaska
Supreme Court affirmed. 43
The initiative summary in question stated that the proposed bill would
"prevent classification of persons on the basis of... local residency, past
use or dependence on the resource... .'" The appellants contended
that this language was misleading because it falsely implied that the bill
could eliminate those preferences required by federal law.145 The
supreme court rejected the appellants' challenge, reasoning that the
lieutenant governor was not obligated in the summary to give a special
reminder to the voters that the initiative could serve only to change state
but not federal law.14
In reaching this result, the court enunciated several principles to guide
review of initiative summaries. 47 First, the court held that "[tihe burden
is upon those attacking the summary to demonstrate that it is biased or
misleading."14 Second, in conducting their inquiry, courts should utilize
"a deferential standard of review."'49 The court explained that:
"[A]1l legitimate presumptions should be indulged in favor of the propriety
of the attorney-general's actions. Only in a clear case should a title so
prepared be held insufficient. Stated another way, if reasonable minds may
differ as to the sufficiency of the title, the title should be held to be
sufficient."' s
Thus, according to the Burgess court, an initiative summary should not be
invalidated simply because the court believes it could write a better
ballot).
143. Burgess, 654 P.2d at 277.
144. Id& at 274.
145. Id. at 274-75.
146. Id. at 276.
147. Under Alaska Statutes section 15.45.090, the lieutenant governor is required
to prepare for the initiative petition "an impartial summary of the subject matter of
the bill." ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.090 (19883 (emphasis added). This summary is to
be distinguished from the ballot propositionitself, which "shall... give a true and
mpartia-summary of the proposed law." Id. § 15.45.180(a) (emphasis added). In
Burgess, both a petition summary and ballot proposition were in issue; the court,
however, did not distinguish between the two. Burgess, 654 P2d at 275-77.
148. Burgess, 654 P.2d at 276.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 276 n.7 (quoting Epperson v. Jordan, 82 P.2d 445, 448 (Cal. 1938)).
The Alaska Supreme Court noted tat this deferential standard was consistent with
that applied by the California Supreme Court in Epperson, by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Say v. Baker, 322 P.2d 317, 319 (Colo. 1958), and by the Arkansas Supreme
Court in Mason v. Jernigan, 540 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Ark. 1976). The California court
refers to this standard as simply requiring "substantial compliance" with the statutory
requirements. Epperson, 82 P.2d at 450.
19921
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one.'-' The Burgess court nonetheless emphasized that the summary
must be true and impartial." a The court also embraced the concept that
the summary need only mention the main features of the bill, stating that
"'details may be omitted or in many instances covered by broad
generalizations. ' ' 1
53
In applying the Burgess principles, a court should recognize that the
lieutenant governor is constrained in two important ways. First, by
definition, the summary must be shorL' Second, the summary must be
drafted in simple language.' 55 These constraints necessarily require the
151. Burgess, 654 P.2d at 276 n.7.
152. I& at 275. According to one authority cited by the Burgess court, an
initiative summary must be 'a fair, concise, true and impartial statement of the
intent of the proposed measure. The summary may not be an argument for or
against the measure, nor can it be likely to create prejudice for or against the
measure.'" Id. (quoting In re Second Initiated Constitutional Amendment
Respecting the Rights of the Public to Uninterrupted Service by Public Employees
of 1980, 613 P.2d 867, 869 (Colo. 1980)). Moreover, according to another cited
authority, the summary should be 'complete enough to convey an intelligible idea
of the scope and import of the proposed-law, and that it ought to be free from any
misleading tendency, whether of amplification, of omission, or of fallacy, and that it
must contain no paitisan coloring.'" I& (quoting Hope v. Hall, 316 S.W.2d 199,201(Ark. 1958)).
153. Burgess, 654 P.2d at 275 n.6 (quoting Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver
General, 98 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Mass. 1951)). The court further stated that the
summary must give "a fair and intelligent conception of the main outlines of the
measure. It must do more than merely indicate the field of human or government
activity within which the measure falls. It must go beyond what would serve as the
title to a statute."' Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
154. See AiASKA STAT. § 15.45.180 (1988) (requiring no more than six words for
the ballot title and no more than 100 words for the summary of the proposition).
155. See ici § 15.60.005 (setting forth the formula for scoring readability of ballot
proposition summary and voters pamphlet summary). Section 15.60.005 provides:
Readability of certain election matenrals.
(a) The policy of the state is to prepare a ballot proposition that is clear, concise,
and easily readable. The form of each ballot proposation shall be scored under (c)
of this section. The policy of the state is to prepare a ballot proposition that is scored
at approximately 60.
(b) Each neutral summary prepared for the voter's pamphlet shall be scored under
(c) of this section. The policy of the state is to prepare a neutral summary that is
scored at approximately 60.
(c) A ballot proposition or neutral summary shall be scored using the following
procedures:
(1) disregard numbers;
(2) multiply the average sentence length in words by 1.015;
(3) multiply the average number of syllables for each 100 words by .846;
(4) subtract the total of (2) and (3) from 206.835.
(d) A court may not enjoin the conduct or results of an election for a failure to
comply with (a) or (b) of this section.
ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.005 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
Alaska Statutes section 15.60.010(23) defines "proposition" as "an initiative,
referendum or constitutional amendment submitted at an election to the public for
vote." ALASKA SrAT. § 15.60.010(23) (1988).
Legislative history indicates that the intent of the above provision was to ensure
that ballot propositions can be easily read by the average Alaskan. According to
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lieutenant governor to exercise discretion as to which features of the
proposed bill should be mentioned in the summary and how those features
should be described.
Obviously, a short summary cannot describe in detail a complex
initiative. Thus, courts in other jurisdictions have held that: (1) the
lieutenant governor's duty is to summarize only the "central features" or
the "primary purpose" of the proposed bill;'s6 (2) the summary need not
include "every effect that the proposed measure may have on the present
statutory scheme";'- 7 and (3) the summary need not even mention the
existence of other statutes addressing the same subject' 53 In assessing
the sufficiency of summaries, at least one court has also recognized that the
summaries generally are not the only source of voter information,
especially with respect to controversial issues subject to extensive public
debate and publicity.'
VI. SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR ANALYSIS
Before an initiative can be presented to the electorate, the legislature
must first be given the opportunity to remove the initiative from the ballot
by passing a law that is "substantially the same."'1  In Warren v.
Boucher,"6' the Alaska Supreme Court explored the issue of how similar
the initiative and the legislative act need to be in order to void the
initiative. The court examined two legislative ethics measures: an initiative
entitled "An Act relating to campaign contributions, expenditures, and their
limitations," and an enactment of the legislature entitled "An Act relating
to the election campaigns; and providing for an effective date."'
'
statistics available to the legislature at the time, 14% of adults nationwide were
functionally illiterate (i.e., reading below the fourth grade level), and 18% of
Alaskans over 24 had not graduated from high school or received a General
Equivalency Degree ("GED'). Memorandum from Mike Davis, Representative,
Alaska State Legislature, to the House Judiciary Committee (Apr. 27, f987) (on file
with the Alaska Law Review). The provision provides a readability formula, based
on the "Flesch test," designed to make all ballot propositions readable at
approximately the eighth grade reading level. Id
156. In the Matter of Increase of Taxes on Tobacco Products Initiative, 756 P2d
995, 998-99 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
157. Id at 999.
158. In the Matter of the Proposed Initiative on Transfer of Real Estate, 611 P2d
981, 983 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 424 N.E2d 469, 483 (Mass. 1981).
159. Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 424 N.E.2d at 485.
160. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4.
161. 543 P2d 731 (Alaska 1975).
162. 11 at 732.
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In a split (3-2) decision, the court broadly defined the phrase
"substantially the same." While conceding that there were many
differences between the ethics initiative in question and the legislature's
subsequent ethics act, the court found that they "accomplishted] the same
general goals" and that they "adopt[ed] similar, although not identical,
functional techniques to accomplish those goals."' An important factor
in the court's analysis was the finding that "[tihe variances in detail
between the measures are no more than the legislature might have
accomplished through reasonable amendment had the initiative become
law."'  In general, the court concluded that "[i]f in the main the
legislative act achieves the same general purpose as the initiative, if the
legislative act accomplishes that purpose by means or systems which are
fairly comparable, then substantial similarity exists.'
'
The "substantially similar" analysis provides the sponsors of the
initiative with an opportunity to achieve their goals without the time,
expense, and uncertainty inherent in the initiative process. Once the
legislature recognizes that there is a great deal of public support for a
measure (as evidenced by a large number of initiative signatures), it may
act on the proposal.'6
VII. CONCLUSION
To the practitioner, initiative law can be exciting and challenging. The
pace of litigation is brisk, and the public policy stakes are usually high.
Knowing the rules is essential, as is analyzing the advantages,
disadvantages and risks inherent in the initiative process.
Initiatives have served as an important pressure valve for our
democratic system in Alaska. Where the legislature has not acted, the
people can do so. The broad interpretation of the people's right to initiate
law is critical to the exercise of that right.
Many areas of initiative law, such as the scope of pre-election judicial
review and the prohibition against using initiatives to prescribe court rules,
163. I& at 739.
164. I
165. Id at 736.
166. In the case of the telephone competition legislation sponsored by GCI,
Alaska State Senator Pat Pourchot insisted that the major players (GCI, Alascom
and the APUC) sit down in an attempt to negotiate legislation. David Postman,
Pourchot Scrambles to End Phone Wars, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, May 2, 1990,
at A-1, Back Page. Ultimately, the negotiations were successful, and, less than two
weeks later, the legislaturepassed the compromise legislation mandating telephone
competition. See ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.880-.890 (Supp. 1991). GCI saved hundreds
of thousands of dollars in campaign expenses as a resilt.
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are well settled. Other areas of initiative law are not resolved, and will
undoubtedly lead to further litigation. For example, there is a significant
need to resolve the test applied to determine whether an initiative
constitutes "special legislation." As discussed in this article, the Alaska
Supreme Court should adopt either a "statewide interest!' test or an "any
conceivable factual basis" test for special legislation. Both tests are
consistent with the Alaska Supreme Court's constitutionally-based
deference to the initiative, can be readily applied within the time
constraints of a pre-election challenge, and are preferable for other public
policy and legal reasons. Similarly, the courts should continue to review
initiative summaries liberally, recognizing that the electorate receives
abundant information from many sources about initiatives on the ballot.
On the state level, the statutory procedure for instituting an initiative
is appropriately straightforward, and, most importantly, properly requires
a pre-circulation review of initiatives by the lieutenant governor. To
minimize last-minute litigation and unnecessary expenditures, local
governments such as the Municipality of Anchorage should adopt similar
procedures providing for pre-circulation review. This will benefit all
concerned: the initiative sponsors, the initiative opponents, the courts, and
the electorate.
The courts in Alaska have generally defended and should continue to
defend the people's right to initiate law. If they do so, the future exercise
of the right to initiate law will remain bright.
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